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Dysphoria is a complex phenomenon which must be defi ned in the framework of different forms of affections. It belongs 
to the broader fi eld of emotions, which are characterized by some essential features: i.e. movement, passiveness, tran-
sitoriness, and reference to the others. All these four essential features of emotion are specifi cally altered in depression, 
whose phenomenology is presented in a clinical case. In discussing dysphoria, a fi rst distinction is made between par-
ticular and global affections. The fi rst type encompasses emotions and feelings, while the second one includes humor, 
mood and temper. Dysphoria belongs to one of these global affective states: the humor, which has to do with the spatial 
dimension of existence. In dysphoria the patient experiences the world as oppressive and invasive of his/her intimacy; 
the others are lived as persons demanding answers or actions he/she is not able to fulfi ll. Finally, the phenomenology of 
dysphoria is analyzed through the four essential features described above and examples are given.
Keywords: dysphoria, mood, emotions, humor, phenomenology, psychopathology, hermeneutics. 
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INTRODUCTION
Dysphoria is a symptom which is diffi cult to 
defi ne. It has been used to refer to a sensation 
of displeasure prevailing in some affective disor-
ders and which encompasses different emotions 
and feelings like irritability, anxiety, bad mood, 
impatience, pessimism, etc. All these affections 
have in common the negative form they are per-
ceived by the patient, which implies a diffuse 
and marked sense of uneasiness. These patients 
are very sensible to several kinds of stimuli. 
They promptly react to minimal changes in the 
affective disposition of the others and can easily 
become aggressive. In this article we will try to 
fi nd a place for this complex phenomenon in the 
framework of the different forms of affections 
characterizing human being. Since dysphoria be-
longs to the broader fi eld of emotions, we think 
that an etymological research can help us in ad-
vancing in the knowledge of emotions in general 
and of dysphoria in particular, with special refer-
ence to its importance in affective disorders.
ETYMOLOGY OF EMOTION
The word “emotion” is derived from the 
French word émotion, appeared in the 16th cen-
tury, and that in turn derives from émouvoir, 
whose meaning is to move. The French word 
comes from Latin, movere, which has several 
meanings. At least two of these meanings corre-
spond to refl exive verbs (to move and to tremble) 
and the others refer to transitive verbs, such as to 
transform, to stimulate, to disquiet, to frighten 
and to enthusiasm. From this brief etymologic 
digression we can infer some essential features 
of the so ubiquitous phenomenon of emotion. 
They are the following:
1st The movement: all the mentioned verbs re-
fer to a change, a movement of the psychic life. 
That something makes me tremble, or stimulates 
me, means that a certain degree of transforma-
tion is produced in me; this can be either posi-
tive or negative, but it is always a movement. 
In the ambit of what romance languages call 
emotion, Karl Jaspers (1959) distinguishes be-
tween feelings, affections and moods and in the 
defi nition of each one of them he also uses the 
word “movement” or “course” (Verlauf), as for 
example: “The feelings are peculiar movements 
of the soul”, “The affections are complex tem-
porary units (courses) of feelings”, etc. (p. 91).
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2nd The passiveness of the subject who suffers 
the change. With the exception of the verb “to 
move”, that could refer to a voluntary move-
ment (“I move”), all the other meanings point to 
the fact that the subject of movere, of the emo-
tion, is a passive subject; that is to say, he can-
not determine that which moves him. I cannot 
decide that something enthusiasms me, scares 
me or transforms me. We said that “to move” is 
in exception, although movere can also be used 
in passive form, referring to “being moved”. In 
his “Theory of emotions” (1965), Sartre says 
with respect to this: “What forms intrinsic part 
of emotion is that it apprehends in the object 
something that is infi nitely besides it” (p. 111). 
And later he affi rms: “We live emotively a qual-
ity that penetrates in us, that we suffer and that 
exceeds us everywhere” (p. 113).
3rd The transitoriness: the third element that 
seems of the greatest importance to us, in par-
ticular because it is very strikingly altered in the 
affective diseases, is its peculiar temporality. 
The emotions arise, completely invade the sub-
ject and then, after some time, which is variable 
according to the case, they disappear. Nobody 
can remain for a too long time joyful or sad or 
wrathful. It is extreme the case of those emotions 
which are very close to the body experience, 
such as the ones associated with the sense of taste 
and with the sense of smell, where the emotion 
is diffi cult to distinguish from sensation. The 
poet Rainer Maria Rilke described in only one 
verse this feature characteristic of oral emotions: 
“Wait… the fl avor… and it has already escaped” 
(1977, Sonnet 15 of the 1st Part of the Sonnets 
to Orpheus). Both the aroma and the fl avor (or 
the emotion awaken by them) invade the subject, 
prolong in a certain way the present, and then 
disappear. This phenomenon is ephemeral in the 
case of the aroma and a little more lasting in the 
fl avor. That moment which stretches in the fl a-
vor is represented in the verse by the suspension 
points before and after the expression “das sch-
meckt”, that we have translated by “the fl avor”, 
given the ambiguity that would have to say “that 
fl avor”, which would be the literal translation. 
This peculiar temporality of the emotions, which 
can be specially appreciated in those which are 
associated to the senses of taste and of fl avor, 
was also described by Kant in his Anthropology, 
when he says that the pleasure produced by the 
sense of taste can only be fl eeting and transitory 
to be able to please (Kant, 1838).
4th The reference to the other: the fourth element 
inferred from the etymology of the word emotion 
also appears in all the meanings of the original 
Latin word, but particularly from the fi rst French 
derivation: émouvoir, to move. And this is the 
necessary presence of the other, of the world, in 
every emotion, something also expressed by Sar-
tre (1965, p.76), when he says: “The emotional 
conscience is fi rst of all conscience of the world”. 
And then he adds: “One does not need many re-
fl ections to realize that the emotion comes at ev-
ery instant back to the object and is nourished by 
it […] And how to speak of rage, in which blows 
are given, insults and threats are proffered, with-
out mentioning the person who represents the 
objective unity of those insults, of those threats 
and of those blows”. And he ends categorically 
by affi rming: “In a word, the moved subject and 
the moving object are united in an indissoluble 
synthesis” (Sartre, 1965,p. 77).
THE EMOTIONAL WORLD IN DEPRES-
SION
It is quite evident that the fundamental per-
turbation of this disease concerns the emotional 
life. It is not by chance that depression belongs 
to the group of the so called “affective diseases” 
or “mood diseases”. In German language the 
word “emotion” does not exist, but its concept is 
contained in three phenomena which in a certain 
way are different, but very close to one another: 
feelings, affections and moods (Gefühle, Affekte 
und Stimmungen). Let us see now how the de-
scribed four essential features of emotion are 
specifi cally altered in this disease:
1. The emotion as movement: one of the fun-
damental phenomena of the nuclear depressive 
syndrome is the alteration of the body-world re-
lation, that is, the classic psychomotor inhibition 
(Doerr-Zegers et al., 1971; Doerr-Zegers, 1993). 
It is the same phenomenon that Binswanger 
(1960) rightly characterized as “not being able 
to”. This progressive incapacity for paying at-
tention, concentrating, deciding, acting, ends 
in that extreme state that is depressive stupor, 
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where there is no movement of the body and 
consequently every emotion disappears.
2. The emotion as passivity: the other central 
phenomenon of this nuclear depressive syn-
drome (Doerr-Zegers, 1997, pp.146-149), more 
or less corresponding to Tellenbach’s “melan-
choly” (1961/1983), is the change in the experi-
ence of the own body, manifested as discourage-
ment, anxiety, lack of energy, sensation of cold, 
multiples pains, etc. It is, in summary, a sort of 
“infl ation” of the corporality, up to the point of 
not leaving space to the spirit and impeding the 
relation with the world and with the others. This 
feeling of being invaded by corporeality, without 
being able to defend oneself from it, would be 
as a caricature of the passivity proper of every 
emotion. It is the predominance of the “body 
as object” (Körper) over the “body as subject” 
(Leib). 
3. The emotion as rhythm: emotion, as well as 
moods, is fundamentally rhythmic and periodic. 
Its temporality is impersonal, unlike the tempo-
rality of feelings. Strictly, one of the essential 
elements of emotion is its transitoriness, the fact 
that it cannot last indefi nitely. We mentioned as 
extreme example the one of the emotions asso-
ciated to the sense of taste and to the sense of 
smell. Now, the fact that emotions lose their nat-
ural rhythmicity is characteristic of depression. 
Instead of disappearing after having invaded 
consciousness, the depressive emotions remain: 
anxiety, discouragement, uneasiness last hours, 
days and weeks, perhaps constituting the most 
important cause of suffering of these patients, 
something dramatically represented in the so 
called “agitated depression”.
4. The emotion as com-motion: but perhaps the 
most striking perturbation of emotional life in 
depressive disease is the one referring to the re-
lation with the world and with oneself. The more 
a discouragement increases, the more the feel-
ings (towards the other) disappear, annulling the 
subject. This perturbation, already present in the 
tendency of these patients to isolation and to si-
lence and expressively in what Schulte (1961) 
called “das Gefühl der Gefühlslosigkeit” (the 
feeling of lack of feelings), acquire its most ex-
treme degree in the so called nihilistic delusion 
of the Cotard syndrome.
Given the fact that in this syndrome all the above-
mentioned characteristics of emotional life are 
presented very strikingly, we will illustrate our 
analysis with the description of a typical case of 
depression we have been treating for some time. 
We also think that in this way we can deeply 
understand the essence of depressive emotions 
in particular and of the disease “depression” in 
general.
A CLINICAL CASE
Verónica is a 40 years old woman, married 
and mother of three children. She has no mor-
bid background and is described both by her 
husband and by her brothers as “totally normal” 
up to the beginning of the disease, two months 
before her admission to the Psychiatric Hospi-
tal. The relatives outline as characteristics of 
her personality her great dedication to the fam-
ily and to the household. She never had confl icts 
neither with her husband, nor with her brothers, 
who remained living in a farm in the south when 
she moved to Santiago. The disease began few 
days after Verónica arrived at the house of her 
relatives to spend the summer holidays with her 
children. There she felt herself, for the fi rst time, 
betrayed by her brothers, when they manifested 
the intention of not giving her the part of heri-
tage she deserved, i.e. a plot of land on which 
she counted for building there a house where 
moving to live. Due to this diffi culty, Verónica 
became very distressed and began to not sleep, 
to not eat and to lose weight. She also com-
plained of multiple bodily pains. At moments 
she manifested the idea of not wanting to go on 
living. One day she was found by her sister try-
ing to hang herself. After some therapeutic in-
terventions in the zone, without fruitful results, 
Verónica was moved to Santiago and was admit-
ted to the Psychiatric Hospital. It is interesting 
to outline that her disease begins when her per-
sonal life project is interrupted. This could be in 
a relation of meaning with her “not being able to 
do anything”, characterizing the fully developed 
syndrome.
At the examination we found a lucid, thin 
woman, looking older than she was and attract-
ing our attention for her great intelligence. Here 
we will textually reproduce her words:
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“What happens with me is that I have everything 
dead; let us say that I am dead, that I am in vegetable 
state from my head to my feet. I have no sense of 
touch, neither sense of smell, neither sense of taste 
for food [...] My body is so light as it does not exist. 
I do not get tired, I can walk kilometers and nothing 
happens to me [...] I would like to feel the weight 
of my eyes to be able to sleep. How am I going to 
be able to rest if I do not feel my body? [...] And 
yet, I dream at nights. Why? Do the dead dream? 
[...] Nothing scares me anymore; I can’t feel the an-
ger. The body is heavy when it is alive, while I do 
not feel the weight of my body [...] I live a science-
fi ction life, the life of a dead person [...] When I take 
my children in my arms, I do not feel them [...] If 
my children knew that they love an artifi cial mother 
[...] My husband does not sleep with me, how is he 
going to be able to sleep with a dead! [...] I do not 
feel the direct contact with the things, neither with 
the others”.
We are in front of a classic melancholic de-
pression with a Cotard syndrome. In North 
American DSM terminology this picture would 
correspond to a “depression of melancholic type 
with psychosis”. We will renounce to what could 
be an interesting psychodynamic digression, to 
concentrate ourselves in the analysis of her emo-
tions and in the way they constitute - paradig-
matically in this case - a bridge between the self 
and the own body, on one side, and the world, on 
the other.
Verónica represents an extreme case of emo-
tional life perturbation in the sense of the clas-
sic “feeling of lack of feelings”, since she feels 
herself dead. This “feeling herself dead”, that 
other less severe patients describe as “freezing 
of the emotions”, is a judgment (for us certainly 
delusional) based on two primary experiences: 
not feeling the own body and not feeling the oth-
ers. The fi rst corresponds to what Husserl (1964) 
called the “primary level of the experience”. He 
defi ned the natural and pre-predicative experi-
ence as a direct and immediate relation with one-
self and with the world, established through the 
body and its senses. And in Ideas I, he emphati-
cally affi rmed that only by its empiric relation 
with the body, the conscience becomes human 
and only by this means it occupies a place in na-
ture’s space and time (Husserl, 1950). In other 
words, it is the body, the fl esh, its materiality it-
self, what prevents the conscience from fl oating 
in the air, empty of all content. And materiality 
is weight and that is precisely what Verónica 
misses. The Lithuanian-French philosopher Em-
manuel Lévinas (1989, p. 31) says with respect 
to this: “The liberty of the self is inseparable 
from its materiality […] The defi nitive charac-
ter of the existent, constituting in turn the tragic 
of solitude, is materiality”. It could also be said 
that without emotion - necessarily emanating 
from the body - there is no life. And for that rea-
son Verónica affi rms that she is dead.
But this extinguishing emotional capacity, in 
its disappearance impedes the relation with the 
world and with the others. Our patient tells us 
that when she takes her children in her arms, she 
does not feel them and that she doesn’t feel the 
direct contact with the things. She thinks that 
her children would be scandalized if they knew 
that they love an artifi cial mother, and she un-
derstands that her husband does not sleep with 
her because “how is he going to sleep with a 
dead!” She also says that the television images 
and the words expressed by the others do not 
enter in her head.
In Ideas I (1950) Husserl affi rms that we must 
remember that only through the experience of a 
bond between the conscience and the lived body 
it is possible something like the reciprocal un-
derstanding between the animal beings belong-
ing to a same world. The openness towards in-
tersubjectivity is produced from the body. Start-
ing from the body and from the perception I 
have of it, I am going to be able to constitute the 
world surrounding me and through which the 
other bodies can be spatialized; and thus, from 
this center that is my body, I am going to con-
stitute the global world and within it, the oth-
ers. When perceiving a thing in the space, the 
subject “becomes aware of the pre-spatiality of 
his percipient fl esh; what constitutes the occa-
sion of the pre-appearing of the fl esh as a ‘per-
ception organ’ is the appearing of the perceived 
thing” (Bernet, 1993). The depressive patient 
with a Cotard syndrome returns to that primor-
dial space called by Lévinas “the space of hor-
ror and of insomnia”, where nothingness and 
emptiness reign. When not perceiving, when not 
feeling neither her own senses (“I have no sense 
of touch, neither sense of smell, neither sense of 
taste”), nor the others (“when I take my children 
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in the arms, I do not feel them”), the patient can-
not become aware of that “pre-spatiality of her 
percipient fl esh” and consequently, there is no 
other possibility than to feel her body as dead.
It is interesting that Lévinas, when he de-
scribes the process of subjectivation, accepting 
that in every moment it is associated to the cor-
porality and to the presence of the other, he af-
fi rms that the most elevated form of being sub-
ject and of relating with the world is joy. The 
otherness is deeply respected in joy. The other 
is not a mere manipulable object anymore, as in 
the way of appropriating that leads to the tech-
nique, but an enjoyable element. The self makes 
himself secure while enjoying the elements, neu-
tralizing the otherness of these, up to incorporate 
them to the immanence of his subjectivity, which 
has been born from enjoyment. And in a moment 
he says that “life is love to life […] life is sat-
isfi ed sensibility” (Lévinas, 1987, p. 131). The 
regressive movement of the subjectivation pro-
cess goes from the loving body to the sovereign 
body, from the sovereign body to the hungry 
body and from this, to the dead body, the nihilis-
tic delusion about the body. It is noteworthy that 
in the last years, for the diagnosis of depression 
increasing importance has been given to anhe-
donia - not being able to enjoy things. And joy 
is based on the capacity to be attracted, moved, 
stimulated and transformed by the other, that is 
to say, on the ability to experience emotions or, 
more precisely, transitive feelings.
Now then, the most perfect form of relation 
with the world and otherness is reached through 
the fellow man. Two primordial elements out-
stand in this relation with the other: the face and 
the caress. The face of the other is the person-
alized transcendence and through it, through 
the face of the beloved, “the whole humanity is 
showed to me in its defenselessness” (Lévinas, 
1987, p. 211). And that is the reason why the 
relation with the other is fundamentally ethic, 
because when the self discovers the fragility of 
all the others in the face of the beloved, he feels 
inclined to say: “Here I am; I make myself re-
sponsible for you”. Now, the most singular and 
proper vehicle for approaching the other is the 
caress:
“The caress, as the contact, is sensibility; but the 
caress transcends what is sensible […] the caress 
consists in not arresting anything […] She searches, 
registers. It is not intentionality of unveiling, but 
of search: march toward the invisible. In a certain 
sense it expresses love, but suffers for incapacity to 
say it” (Lévinas, 1987, p. 267).
Here we cannot develop in detail the phenom-
enology of the caress, but it does seem important 
to us to indicate that if we accept that these two 
sensible elements, the face of the other and the 
caress through which I approach him, are fun-
damental in the constitution of intersubjectivity, 
we will have to recognize that in the deepest de-
grees of depression both are practically absent. 
For our patient the others more than faces are 
masks, and she herself feels as such when she is 
surprised by the fact that her children can love 
an “artifi cial” mother, that is to say, as unreal as 
a rag doll. The others are not a face for her, nei-
ther is she for the others. All the mystery of the 
face has disappeared and both her children and 
herself have been transformed in inanimate be-
ings, in “artifacts”. And if she cannot recognize 
their faces, with greater reason she will not be 
able to caress them. She expressively refers to 
this subject when she insists in asserting her in-
capacity to feel them as alive persons when she 
takes them in her arms. It is diffi cult to fi nd an 
example of failure of emotion intended as com-
motion which is more impressive than this one.
There is a fi nal clinical fact that would be 
important to underline with respect to the emo-
tional life of the depressive patient: unlike what 
occurs in organic apathy or in the peculiar altera-
tion of affectivity observed in schizophrenia, the 
depressive patient suffers for the extinguishing 
of his emotions. Both anhedonia and not feeling 
the love they usually felt for their beloved ones 
is for them a source of suffering almost as im-
portant as anxiety.
DYSPHORIA AS A PATHOLOGICAL EMO-
TION
As we said in the introduction, it is note-
worthy the scarce use of the term “dysphoria” 
in psychopathology and psychiatry. We did not 
succeed in fi nding the fi rst description of it in old 
psychiatric literature. In Kraepelin’s Handbook 
as well as in Bleuler’s one, the word does not 
appear, even though both accurately describe ab-
normal affective states, which are close to what 
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we now understand as dysphoria. In the chapter 
“Abnormal Mood Emotions” Kraepelin (1927) 
states that under the effect of alcohol, but also 
in manic conditions, a special form of mood can 
arise, characterized by permanent irritability and 
restlessness and which in given circumstances 
can lead to agitation. He adds that in both cases, 
in the state conditioned by alcohol or by manic 
depressive illness, the awareness of the abnor-
mality is lacking. Referring to possible similar 
symptoms in depression, Kraepelin makes very 
interesting observations. We will try to make a 
translation of the respective paragraph from a 
relative old German into English:
“Usually the sensation of displeasure proper of de-
pression is accompanied by a sad mood. Sometimes, 
however, a sort of angry irritability is added to this 
mood […] This way, a state of interior tension (‘in-
nere Spannung’) arises, which can lead to intense 
emotional discharges” (Kraepelin, 1927, p. 191).
And later he says:
“We observe this peculiar state in the transition be-
tween depressive dysthymia and manic agitation in 
the manic depressive illness […] It deals perhaps 
with an association between the depressive mood 
and the beginning of excitement.” (Kraepelin, 1927, 
p. 192).
These observations totally agree with the 50 
years’ experience of one of us in the General 
Psychiatric Hospital of Santiago, Chile, only 
interrupted by three periods at the Psychiatric 
Clinic of the University of Heidelberg.
Eugen Bleuler speaks in this context about a 
“pathological irritability”. However, he does not 
describe it in details, only underlining that this 
particular perturbation of mood can be also seen 
in very different pathologies, such as organic 
psychosis, epilepsy, endogenous and reactive 
depressions, manic episodes, neurasthenia, etc. 
(Bleuler, 1975, p. 69). Another classical author, 
Karl Jaspers, mentions dysphoria only once and 
in the framework of epileptic disorders. In re-
lation to the modern literature, it can be stated 
that dysphoria seldom appears. One example: in 
the worldwide known New Oxford Textbook of 
Psychiatry (Gelder et al., 2000; 2010) the word 
“dysphoria” is simply not mentioned. One could 
consequently pose the question whether dyspho-
ria does exist or not. We think that there exist 
some psychopathological phenomena and/or 
states, which with no other better word could be 
characterized as with “dysphoria”. 
An interesting contribution to this subject - 
which could help us to approach the phenomenon 
dysphoria - has been recently made by Pelegrina 
(2006, 2016). He attempts to do a phenomenol-
ogy of the human forms of being affected (what 
corresponds to the wide fi eld of affectivity). The 
aim is to unveil their essence and in this way to 
differentiate the pathological forms from normal 
affective manifestations like sadness, rage, bad 
mood, etc. He proposes as something imperative 
to make fi rst a fundamental distinction between 
particular and global affections. The fi rst type 
encompasses emotions and feelings, while the 
second one includes humor, mood and temper. 
The latter are usually called “affective states”. 
We think, however, that the previously described 
characteristics of emotions correspond in every 
detail to what Pelegrina calls “affections”. Nev-
ertheless, we will accept his conceptualization 
and also the fact that he considers “emotion” as 
only one kind of “affection”, because his phe-
nomenological approach contributes to better 
grasp the essence of the phenomenon we are 
dealing with, i.e. dysphoria.
Emotions and feelings have in common the 
fact that they only appear in relation with a stim-
ulus or as reaction to a given situation. Emotion 
is always a “com-motion”, as we saw in our pre-
vious etymological research; that means that the 
otherness is always present. It is not a feeling I 
experience towards something or somebody, but 
the invasion by the stimulus annulling me as an 
active subject. I am always passive in front of 
an emotion. I suffer from an emotion. The emo-
tions, their stimuli and their reactions are not 
personal and not selected, nor chosen, nor decid-
ed. In the psychopathological realm we observe 
many emotions, like fear, rage, panic, etc. In all 
of them the subject is no more the owner of his 
answers.
The feeling is the communication between my 
personal reality and a particular aspect of the ex-
ternal reality, which has a sense, a special mean-
ing for me. Like in emotions, also in the case of 
feelings the otherness is always present, but in 
a much more elaborated form. In fact emotions 
appear very early in our life, while feelings only 
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start in the puberty or perhaps in adolescence. 
Love is a good example of feeling, because I 
can somehow manage it and I can also construct 
through love my life “with the other”. Different 
is to fall in love. There I am not completely free 
and in it emotion predominates over the feeling. 
Insofar, there are strictly speaking no pathologi-
cal feelings. Sadness is a negative feeling, but 
not a pathological one. In sadness we experience 
the loss of something important in our life and 
this experience belongs to the essence of human 
being, as religion founders and poets - in special 
Rainer Maria Rilke (1st, 9th and 10th Duino El-
egies, 1922/1955) - have repeatedly stated and 
demonstrated. Feelings can however become 
pathological, as it occurs in severe depressions, 
for example, and this happens when in the expe-
rience of lost we feel that we have lost not one, 
but all the possibilities of our life. And this is the 
last fundament of suicide.
The global affective states embrace the person 
as a totality: the relationship to oneself, to the 
others and to the world. They are not founded 
in the meaning (for me) of a given situation, but 
in the transformation of the whole person-world 
relationship. If somebody is in bad humor, this 
does not mean that he is angry with a determined 
person or because of a particular issue. He is an-
gry with the world in general and with himself. 
Three forms of global affective states can be dif-
ferentiated: the humor, the mood and the temper. 
Dysphoria belongs to one of these global affec-
tive states: the humor. Other forms of humors 
are: the anxious, the paranoid, the melancholic 
and the expansive humors. And these humor 
forms are different from a phenomenological 
point of view with respect to moods (depressive, 
expansive) and to the tempers (anxious, inse-
cure, resented, delusional, etc.). 
Humor has to do with the spatial dimension 
in human life. It affectively confi gures the vital 
ambit of realization of my life. It corresponds to 
the question “How are you?” … in the world, 
naturally. In the realm of psychopathology hu-
mors embody different ways of spatiality that 
somehow make diffi cult the process of appro-
priation of reality in the sense of Husserl’s life-
world (Lebenswelt).
Mood has to do with the temporal dimension 
of human life. Mood embodies the temporal 
structures of the interactions dynamics. It cor-
responds to the question: “How are you doing?” 
This question does not refer to the experience of 
oneself as body, as in humor, but to the actions, 
to the plans, to the future. The mood is specifi -
cally altered in depression and in mania, though 
in completely opposite ways. In depression, the 
future becomes progressively close and actions 
more and more diffi cult. In mania, on the con-
trary, everything is possible and the future is 
completely open.
Temper refers to the consistence of the person-
world relationship. Temper corresponds to the 
question: “How do you feel in the world?” or 
“How are you managing your life?” It embodies 
the way it is experienced the correlation between 
the available resources in the external world and 
the own inner resources for facing challenges 
and tasks. Somebody with a “good temper” is 
able to resist the diffi culties and to overcome 
failures or disgraces. In the psychopathological 
sphere, temper is related to more or less vulner-
ability and/or resilience of a person.
And what is then dysphoria? Following Peleg-
rina (2016), we can say that dysphoria represents 
a pathologic form of humor and insofar it has 
to do with the spatial dimension of existence. In 
dysphoria the patient experiences the world as 
oppressive and invasive of his/her intimacy. The 
others are lived as persons demanding answers 
or actions he/she is not able to fulfi ll. Irritabil-
ity - as Kraepelin taught us more than 100 years 
ago - is the most frequent psychic condition of 
these patients. The humor is very instable and 
depending, above all, on the interpersonal rela-
tionships. It is a typical humor of premenstrual 
disorder, but also of the borderline personalities, 
as Stanghellini and Rosfort (2013) have so clear-
ly showed. As we saw previously, dysphoria was 
described by Kraepelin in an unsurpassed way, 
even though he did not use this term. We have 
also observed dysphoria in two other conditions, 
depression and mania, though with different nu-
ances in the form of presentation. 
In depression, above all in recurrent cases 
treated by us during many years, we could state 
the appearance of typical dysphoric humor in the 
pre-depressive situation, just when the depres-
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sive episode menaces to overwhelm the person 
and his world. We have interpreted this peculiar 
reaction as a defense against the retardation and 
the incapacity, which characterizes this condi-
tion. The hyperactivity and irritability represent 
the last effort done by these patients – mostly 
bipolar, but also unipolar – for avoiding the fall 
in the abyss of the disease. With a certain fre-
quency the patients succeed and the episode van-
ishes, like a storm. In other cases this effort fails 
and we observe how this irritability disappears 
behind the silence, the sadness and the incapac-
ity proper of melancholic depression.
Manic patients present very often dysphoric 
states as described also by Kraepelin. The mech-
anism of the emergence of dysphoria in manic 
and depressed patients is completely different. 
Manic patients get impatient and irritable be-
cause the world, and particularly the others, are 
not able to think and act with the velocity they 
estimate as normal. Their pretentions in every 
ambit do not know any measure, any limit and to 
face this denegation in satisfying their demands 
– from the side of the world – becomes for them 
something unbearable. Irritability is a common 
manifestation of mania; this is however a very 
unspecifi c symptom. It should be the challenge 
of a phenomenological psychopathology to fi nd 
the way for discovering the essential features of 
a given disorder. This will allow not only a more 
adequate diagnostic process, but also a better in-
terpersonal approach.
Finally, we would like to show how the differ-
ent features characterizing emotion in general, 
which we derived at the beginning from the ety-
mology of the word, are present in dysphoria.
1. The movement, the dynamic element of every 
emotion, appears in dysphoria as the corporal 
restlessness always accompanying irritability. 
The dysphoric state is the opposite of being at 
peace with oneself and with the world, from se-
renity. It is being under pressure, urgency, loss 
of control, impulsivity. All these characteristics 
are observed in outstanding form in the affective 
life of borderline patients, but also in manic and 
in depressive patients (in the last ones, prior to 
falling into a full depressive episode).
2. The second element peculiar to emotion is, as 
we saw, passivity: the subject cannot decide to be 
in one state or the other: dysphoria happens with-
out notice and invades the subject who is unable 
to defend himself against it. The patients with 
premenstrual syndrome bitterly complain of this 
state which is so disturbing for the relations with 
others and that they cannot manage. Something 
similar occurs with depressive patients at the be-
ginning of a phase. Borderline patients are un-
able to take distance from their emotional states 
and particularly from dysphoria, with which in 
a certain way they identify themselves, blaming 
others for the consequent discomforts.
3. The third element peculiar to every emotion 
is transitoriness. This feature is observed with 
particular evidence in premenstrual dyspho-
ria. Menstruation begins and the state disap-
pears. Something similar occurs with what we 
described previously as pre-depressive dyspho-
ria: it is enough that inhibition, insomnia and 
the rest of the depressive symptoms appear, for 
pre-depressive dysphoria to disappear. In ma-
nias, by contrast, dysphoria only diminishes 
with the treatment and in the case of borderline 
patients this state of effervescence, discomfort 
and irritability generally fades when changes are 
produced in signifi cative interpersonal relation-
ships, usually when the other cedes or concedes.
4. The last element we infer from the etymology 
of “emotion” is commotion, that is, its perma-
nent reference to the other. This is something ex-
pressly suggested by Pelegrina in his classifi ca-
tion of the affective states, when he refers to the 
characteristics of emotions and feelings. This ac-
tive participation of the other in the dynamic of 
dysphoria is particularly evident, as we just said, 
in borderline personalities. It is also observed in 
depressive and manic dysphoria but not in the 
premenstrual syndrome, which course is inde-
pendent from the relationship with others.
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